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Most of the information operations involve users who may foster polarization and distrust toward science
and mainstream journalism, without these users being conscious of their role. Gab is well known to be an
extremist-friendly platform that performs lile control on the posted content. us it represents an ideal
benchmark for studying phenomena potentially related to polarization such as misinformation spreading.
e combination of these factors may lead to hate as well as to episodes of harm in the real world. In this
work we provide a characterization of the interaction paerns within Gab around the COVID-19 topic. To
assess the spreading of dierent content type, we analyze consumption paerns based on both interaction
type and source reliability. Overall we nd that there are no strong statistical dierences in the social response
to questionable and reliable content, both following a power law distribution. However, questionable and
reliable sources display structural and topical dierences in the use of hashtags. e commenting behaviour of
users in terms of both lifetime and sentiment reveals that questionable and reliable posts are perceived in the
same manner. We can conclude that despite evident dierences between questionable and reliable posts Gab
users do not perform such a dierentiation thus treating them as a whole. Our results provide insights toward
the understanding of coordinated inauthentic behavior and on the early-warning of information operation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms play a crucial role in the public sphere, shaping the public discussion on a
wide range of topics including politics, health, climate change, economics, migration [6, 7, 11, 20].
Users online have shown tendency a) to acquire information adhering to their system of beliefs [5],
b) to ignore dissenting information [46], c) to form polarized groups around a shared narrative [21].
One of the dominating traits of online social dynamics, indeed, is polarization [40]. Divided in echo
chambers, users account for the coherence with their preferred narrative rather than the true value
of the information [18, 19]. is scenario creates the perfect incubator for information operations
[13]. Among the most pressing issues is the spread of ctitious and low-quality information (e.g.,
fake news, rumors, hoaxes). estionable means are oen used to inuence the public opinion
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toward polarization or to burst distrust in governments and institutions [19]. e spread of low-
quality information is sometimes carried out by groups of coordinated or automated accounts
that pollute and tamper with our social environments by injecting and sharing a large number of
targeted messages [23], i.e., what Facebook calls coordinated inauthentic behavior” [26]. Although
some studies focused on the interplay between false and real information [41], the main point
to understand is how information ts into a larger disinformation campaign [13, 38]. Most of
the information operations involve users which are not aware of their role but which may foster
polarization and distrust toward science and mainstream journalism [4, 22, 27, 36].
In this paper we characterize users behavior in an extremist social media platform. All social
media platforms, indeed, present distinct features such as the type of content as well as users
interaction options [12, 14]. Along with mainstream platforms like Facebook, Twier, YouTube
and Instagram, niche ones such as Gab or Reddit have been created. ese platforms strongly
dier for various aspects mainly related to the political leaning of the user base and to the content
regulation policy implemented. e laer element has crucial importance, being strongly linked to
the risk of opinion polarization and to the development of hating contents [14]. Within such niche
media, biased information proliferates [15] and users, either interested in joining the community or
banned by other social media, tend to develop the feeling of community belonging with like-minded
individuals, i.e., an echo-chamber [19]. Hence, studying users interaction paerns in platforms like
Gab becomes of primary interest in order to shed light on the dynamics of content production and
information spreading in such segregated environment.
In this study, we explore dierent aspects related to the spreading of both questionable and
reliable contents in Gab by taking into account several aspects, namely: the users’ reactions, the
topics embedded in hashtag networks and the users’ sentiment. In more detail, we rst focus on the
dierences between interactions types in terms of frequency and time. en we build statistically
validated hashtag co-occurrence networks assessing the topological dierences between questionable
and reliable contents. Finally, we analyze the interplay between sentiment of comments and
commenting behavior with respect to information source questionability.
e paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the current state of the art of non-
mainstream social media, focusing in particular on Gab. Section 3 describes the mathematical tools
behind the analysis. Section 4 describes how results are obtained, while Section 5 summarizes the
results and discusses the possible applications associated.
2 STATE OF THE ART
A wide research eort has been paid to characterize online information operations [13, 25, 28, 37, 43]
especially in the case of terrorism [9, 30, 39]. Several works addressed the analysis of social behaviors
to detect features with the aim to anticipate and thus inhibits information disorders [10, 34, 40, 44].
Most of the tactics tend to exploit the conrmation bias [19] of users to foment heated debates
[2, 42]. Niche social media performing lile regulation on their contents seem to be the ideal
environment for triggering polarization dynamics that can eventually turn into actions of harm
even oine [17].
Gab is an online social platform, describing itself as “A social network that champions free
speech, individual liberty and the free ow of information online. All are welcome” [1]. Such a
claim, together with the political leaning of its founders and developers, made Gab the safe haven
for the alt-right movement. However, low moderation and regulation of contents has resulted in a
widespread of hate speech and fake news. For these reasons, it has been repeatedly suspended by
its service provider, and its mobile app has been banned from both App and Play stores [45]. In
particular, Gab aracted the interest of researchers due to its permissive content regulatory policy
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and the political leaning of its users. In [33] authors analyze the content shared on Gab and the
leaning of users, nding a rather homogeneous environment prone to share right biased content.
Authors of [45] characterize Gab in terms of users leaning and content shared, suggesting that
it is more similar to a safe place for right wing extremist rather than a environment where free
speech is protected. Moreover, a topological analysis performed by authors of [14] reveals that Gab
users appear as one quite homogeneous cluster biased to the right. Further, dierently from other
platforms such as Twier and Facebook, in Gab there is a lack of users with leaning opposite to the
most popular one. Overall, all these studies suggest that Gab can be considered as a homogeneous
environment where biased content and misinformation may easily proliferate.
3 PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
Networks. e basis for the conceptualization of a network is a graph G = (V ,E), being V the set
of n nodes and E the set ofm edges. e nodes are denoted as i, j ∈ V or, similarly, i, j = 1, . . . ,n,
and the edge that formalizes the connection between i and j is denoted as (i, j) .
With A we denote the adjacency matrix, a n-squared binary matrix taking values 0 or 1, where
the element Ai j = 1 if nodes i and j are connected and Ai j = 0 otherwise; the degree of the node i
is ki =
∑
j Ai j , and it quanties the number of neighbours of the node i; the number of links in the
graph G ism = 12
∑
i j Ai j . A graph that respects the last formalized equality, called Handshaking
Lemma, is an undirected graph. Another instance that we take into account is the bipartite graph,
that is a graph in which the vertex set V is the union of two disjoint independent sets called the
partitions of G. e equivalent of an adjacency matrix for a bipartite graph is a h × p rectangular
matrix called incidence matrix B that takes values 0 or 1, where the element Bi j = 1 if nodes i and
j are connected. A bipartite graph can be easily projected onto one of its partitions by performing
an operation called one-mode projection that can be formalized in terms of the product P = BTB,
in the case we are projecting onto the partition of size p, and P = BBT if we are projecting onto
the partition of size h. P is a symmetric matrix whose elements Pi j are nonnegative numbers that
represent, in the case of o-diagonal elements, the number of common links of the nodes i and j to
the partition of size h or p. e diagonal elements of the matrix P are also nonnegative numbers
that represent the degree of the node in the bipartite graph. Since the elements on the diagonal of
the matrix P have a dierent meaning with respect to the elements away from the diagonal, it is
common practice to set the diagonal elements Pii = 0. e matrix P aer such a treatment, can be
also called co-occurence matrix since two elements are interconnected if they are co-connected to
at least one node of the partition they don’t belong to. In addition, the number of co-connections
between i and j is represented by the link weight, i.e., by the element Pi j of the matrix P.
Hashtag Co-occurence Network. Starting from the set P of all posts and the setH of the hashtags
found in those posts, we create the bipartite network T , whose nodes are posts and hashtags. A
link between an hashtag hi and a post pi exists if the hashtag hi is used inside the post pi . From the
bipartite network T we create the hashtag co-occurrence weighted network H by projecting the
bipartite network T onto the partitionH . Additionally, such a network is statistically validated by
using the methodology presented in [8, 31]. e result is hence a co-occurrence hashtag network
where two hashtag are connected if their co-occurrence in the set of posts is statistically signicant.
Data Collection. Gab provides a search tool that returns a list of users, hashtags and groups
related to the keyword queried. Starting from Google Trends results, we select a set of popular
research keywords that we feed into Gab search tool and we download all hashtags linked to them.
We then inspect the results and manually lter them based on the hashtag meaning. Finally, we
download all the posts with relative comments linked to each hashtag we select. We end up with
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116343 posts, associated with 16144 dierent hashtags, that received 96757 likes, 20001 comments
and 60563 reblogs by 4293 users in the period 01/01/2020 – 31/03/2020.
estionable and Reliable Sources. In order to evaluate the questionability of information cir-
culating in Gab we employ a source-based approach. We build a dataset of news outlets website
domains where each domain in our dataset is labeled either as ”questionable” or ”reliable” by
means of the classication of the respective news outlet provided by a fact-checking organization
called MediaBias/FactCheck (MBFC, hps://mediabiasfactcheck.com). MBFC has been frequently
used for source classication [3, 8, 14]. It provides a classication determined by ranking bias in
four dierent categories that are: Biased Wording/Headlines, Factual/Sourcing, Story Choices and
Political Aliation. A score is assigned to each category per each news outlet and the average score
determined the bias of the outlet, as explained in the Methodology Section of the website. To each
news outlet is associated a label that refers either to a political bias, namely, Right, Right-Center,
Least-Biased, Le-Center and Le or to its reliability that is expressed in three labels namely,
Conspiracy-Pseudoscience, Pro-Science or estionable. Noticeably, also the estionable set
includes a wide range of political biases, from Extreme Le to Extreme Right. For instance, the Right
label is associated to Fox News, the estionable label to Breitbart (the well-known extreme right
outlet) and the Pro-Science label to Science. Using such a classication, we divide the news outlets
into estionable outlets and Reliable outlets. All the outlets already classied as estionable
or belonging to the category Conspiracy-Pseudoscience are labelled as estionable, the rest is
labelled as Reliable.
Considering all the 2637 news outlets that we retrieve from the list provided by MBFC we end
up with 800 outlets classied as estionable 1837 outlets classied as Reliable.
Hashtag estionability Index. In order to measure the extent to which an hashtag is used in
posts associated with either reliable or questionable contents, we introduce a measure called
questionability. e measure is dened in the range q ∈ [0, 1] and it equals 0 when a certain hashtag
is used exclusively in posts associated to reliable sources while it equals 1 when a certain hashtag
is used only in posts associated to questionable sources.
Formally, hashtag questionability can be dened as follows: let P be the set of all posts with a
url matching a domain in our dataset andH the set containing all the hashtags. At each element
pj ∈ P is associated a binary value lj ∈ {0, 1} based on the domain of the link contained: if the url
refers to a domain classied as questionable then lj = 1, otherwise lj = 0. Considering and hashtag
hi in the bipartite network T then the questionability index qi of hashtag hi can be dened as:
qi =
1
ki
ki∑
j=1
lj , (1)
where lj is the questionability score of the j-th neighbour of the hashtag hi .
4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION
In this section we analyze and compare how users perceive news in terms of reactions to posts,
topics embedded in hashtag networks and users’ sentiment.
4.1 Consumption Paerns
We investigate the news consumption and the activity of Gab users by considering a dataset of
posts related to the COVID-19 pandemics. As shown in Figure 1, users tend to prefer a type of
interaction that is more immediate and less cognitive-demanding [32]. Indeed, the le panel of
Figure 1 shows how Likes are the most active way to engage, consequently followed by Reblogs and
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Replies. e same behaviour is also conrmed by the cumulative number of interactions during the
analyzed period. In this case, the dierence between Likes and Reblogs is less accentuated until the
beginning of February, with all distributions following an incremental trend that is comparable
with consumption paerns from other social media [15].
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Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of interactions with posts (le) and their cumulative engagement (right). A
like is usually a positive feedback on a news item. A reblog indicates a desire to spread a news item to friends.
A reply can have multiple features and meanings and can generate collective debate. The le panel display
that every kind of reaction follows an heavy-tailed distribution that allows room for large deviations, i.e.,
some posts go viral. The right panel displays the evolution of the cumulative number of interactions over
time. The trend is always increasing with a rapid increase at the beginning of February that is likely to be
connected to the beginning of the COVID-19 infodemic. Both plots show how likes are the preferred type of
interaction and how their frequencies are inversely proportional to the amount of cognitive eort required.
e consumption paern can also be analyzed considering the categorization of posts into ques-
tionable and reliable. Panel 2a of Figure 2, displays the distribution of like reaction to questionable
and reliable contents that, overall, show a rather similar behaviour. In fact, both type of posts are
subject to receive a disproportionate amount of likes.
Panel 2b of Figure 2 shows the probability distributions of the number of posts by category with
their corresponding ts.To check that those ts follow a power law distribution [16], we perform a
bootstrap procedure [24] for both categories. Aer having estimated xmin and α , we compute n1,
i.e., the number of values below xmin from the initial dataset, and n2, i.e the dierence with the
total cardinality n and the n1 previously calculated. Consequently, we perform 5000 randomized
instances where, for each of them, we performed a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test between the uniform
distribution U (1,xmin), containing n1 values, and the power law distribution with parameter a,
containing n2 values. We end up with obtaining a p-value that ranges from 0.90 to 0.95 for the
distribution of likes to questionable, and 0.986 to 0.992 for the reliable ones. us we can accept
the hypothesis that data is generated by a power law distribution. e estimated exponent is 3.36
and 3.34 for questionable and reliable sources respectively, implying the presence of very large
deviation in the number of likes for both categories.
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estionable Reliable Intersection
hashtag degree hashtag degree hashtag degree
brands 7 outbreak 763 pandemic 235
apology 7 tc 422 cdc 200
dominic 7 wwg1wga 236 who 195
raab 7 kag 173 news 183
thanks 7 donaldjohntrump 163 cia 166
dominance 7 Coronavirus∗ 147 trump 164
key 7 boingboing 141 health 156
shitholecountry 7 startups 137 virus 155
- - walkaway 133 democrats 148
- - school 122 maga 147
Table 1. Top 10 hashtags in the largest connected component.∗ Translation from Tamil language.
Panels 2c and 2d of Figure 2 show the temporal evolution of the cumulative and average number
of likes to questionable and reliable contents. e matching between the two curves observed in the
panel 2c is due to an increase in the number of reliable posts rather than to an increase in the users
endorsement to such posts. Indeed, as conrmed by panel 2d of Figure 2, questionable posts receive
on average an higher number of likes. It is nonetheless interesting the ination in the number
of reliable posts happened at the beginning of February that could be related either to a growing
concern about the global pandemic or to a growing debate around reliable news. Nonetheless, this
ination does not reect in a correspondent growth in the number of likes, showing a constant
interest of Gab users towards questionable sources.
4.2 Comparingestionable and Reliable Hashtags
Hashtags are a good proxy for describing the semantic and topical elements of posts. erefore,
investigating the interplay between the use of hashtags and the diversity of information sources
may unveil the narratives related to questionable and reliable contents. To achieve this goal,
we consider 17996 hashtags appeared in labelled posts. e hashtags can be divided into three
categories: those appearing only in questionable posts (qi ∈ [0.95, 1]), those appearing only in
reliable posts (qi ∈ [0, 0.05]) and those appearing in both types of posts (qi ∈ (0.05, 0.95)). e rst
subset is made up of 1332 hashtags, the second is made up of 14565 hashtags and the third is made
up of 2099 hashtags. e hashtag questionability, described in Equation 1, follows a multimodal
distribution with peaks located at extreme values, as shown in Figure 3.
We use these sets in order to build their corresponding co-occurrence networks using the
procedure described in Section 3, which are represented in Figure 4. e ten hashtags of the largest
connected component with highest prominence in terms of degree are reported in Table 1. e
networks related to purely questionable and purely reliable contents display a strongly disconnected
structure made up of multiple connected components. In the case of questionable sources we have
a decentralized structure with a largest connected component of 8 vertices, accounting for the 2%
of the total network. We also notice how most of the other connected components are organized as
cliques. is highlights that questionable news have their own dialect in terms of hashtags. In the
case of reliable sources we have a more centralized structure due to the contribution of its largest
connected component that consists of 8527 vertices. Noticeably, the largest connected components
accounts for 77% of the number of reliable hashtags, revealing a dierent structure with respect to
purely estionable hashtags.
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Fig. 2. Panel a: distribution of the frequency of likes obtained by posts related to questionable and reliable
sources. Panel b: Probability distribution of the number of likes to posts related to questionable and reliable
sources. Panel c: Cumulative number of like over time for questionable and reliable sources. Panel d: Average
number of likes per post over time for questionable e reliable sources. The average is computed using a time
window that contains all the posts since January the 1st . Posts from both sources are similar in terms of likes’
distribution, whilst their temporal evolution shown a dierentiation starting at the beginning of February.
e investigation of those two networks is then extended by looking at the most central hashtags.
For the purely questionable network, the hashtags with the highest degree value are mostly
associated with political facts and frustration about the current pandemic. In fact, hashtags
referring to Dominic Raab (the rst secretary of state in U.K.) were used, as well as hashtags like
dominance or shitholecountry. For the purely reliable network the most central hashtags are mostly
pandemic-related, e.g. outbreak and school. However, alt-right hashtags such as wwg1wga, which is
generally associated with the Q-Anon movement have an important role.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of questionability between hashtags. The two peaks at the extremes suggest there are
recurrent hashtags for posts belonging to questionable or reliable sources.
e right panel of Figure 4 displays the co-occurrence network related to hashtags that are
signicantly used in both types of posts. In this case the network has a largest connected components
of 2054 nodes that is higher than in the previous cases being about 98% of the total number of
hashtags in the subset. e set of hashtags used in this case in also more general and related either
to COVID-19 (e.g., pandemics, WHO, health) or to politics (e.g., trump, maga, democrats).
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QuestionableReliable
Fig. 4. Projections of Post-Hashtag bipartite networks. Top Le: representation of the projection that
contains only questionable hashtags, i.e., they are only used in posts from questionable sources. Top Right:
representation of the projection that contains only reliable hashtags, i.e., they are only used in posts from
reliable sources. Boom: representation of the projection containing questionable and reliable posts which
have at least one hashtag in common.
4.2.1 Characterizing Commenting Behaviour for estionable and Reliable posts. In order to
understand how news are perceived, we investigate the commenting behaviour of users by means
of the sentiment expressed in the comments on questionable and reliable posts. We rst pre-process
the text of the comments via lemmatization and we use the Bing Lexicon [29], a list containing
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around 6800 terms related to opinions and sentiments divided by category (Positive or Negative), to
obtain the sentiment of each comment. e sentiment si can be simply computed considering the
number of positive and negative terms, c+i and c−i respectively, by means of the following equation:
si ≡
c+i − c−i
c+i + c
−
i
. (2)
0.0
0.5
1.0
PositiveNeutralNegative
Sentiment
D
en
si
ty
Questionable Reliable
Fig. 5. Sentiment distribution for estionable (red) and Reliable (blue) post’s comments.
Notice that si ∈ [−1, 1] for every i , where −1 means that the comment contains only negative
terms, 0 that terms are equally distributed between positives and negatives and +1 that the comment
contains only positive terms.
By computing the sentiment of comments on questionable and reliable posts, we obtain the
distribution shown in Figure 5. Noticeably, there is no dierence between the sentiment of comments
under estionable an Reliable sources. Furthermore, negative sentiment is what regulates user
comments, with less pronounced peaks in correspondence of positive and neutrals . To assess the
dierence between the two distributions, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [16] that reveals
no dierence signicant dierence between the two distributions (p=0.73).
To provide further insights about the commenting behavior of users under questionable and
reliable posts, we model the persistence of users commenting repeatedly under a post of the same
category. e modeling is performed by means of Kaplan-Meier estimates of two survival functions:
the rst relies on time span between user’s rst and last comment, i.e., lifetime of a user with
respect to comments, whilst the second takes into account the number of comments of a users.
Figure 6 shows Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions grouped by category for the two cases.
Survival curves based on comments lifetime appear very similar (Figure 6a) , while the curves
computed by means of number of comments (Figure 6b) seem to present a slight lower survival
probability for comments to questionable posts. In spite of the laer observation, by performing a
LogRank test [35] we detect no signicant dierence between the two survival functions (p-values
≤ 0.05). us we can state that that the two categories are not signicantly dierent in terms of
survival probabilities: questionable and reliable sourced are perceived in the same way by users in
Gab.
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Fig. 6. Panel a: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions computed using user lifetime, i.e., time span
between user’s first and last comment. Panel b: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions computed using
the number of comments per user. Distributions are statistically indistinguishable in both cases, revealing
the independence of comments’ persistence from source questionability.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we investigate the consumption paerns of users in a segregated environment bringing
the COVID-19 topic as use case. We characterize users engagement on posts in terms of interaction
and how it evolves during time as the pandemic arises. Furthermore, we classied posts into
estionable and Reliable categories depending on the questionability of the information source.
We investigate users endorsement to both categories in terms of social response and their evolution
over time, focusing on dierence and similarities of users behavior. We also exploit a statistical
approach in order to build several hashtag networks divided by source questionability. We analyze
the hashtag networks from a topological perspective and discuss the dierences related to source
type. Finally, we consider comments from both categories and study whether the questionability of
the information source inuences the distribution of the comments sentiment and the persistence
in commenting of users. Our analysis shows that users prefer less cognitive demanding interactions
such as Likes and they aention respect to questionable and reliable sources changes over time:
initially, Gab users tend to prefer questionable sources but they switch to reliable ones as the
pandemic advances. In terms of hashtag associations through posts, the topological analysis reveals
signicant dierences between reliable and questionable sources in terms of both structure and
semantic content.
However, the distribution of the sentiment deriving from the analysis of the comments reveals a
rather similar paern between reliable and questionable sources. Indeed, both distributions show
their peak in correspondence of negative sentiments revealing that the perception of the news
does not depend on the source type. us, our results show that the way in which users process
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Information Consumption and Social Response in a Segregated Environment: the Case of Gab1:11
information in a segregated environment such as Gab is homogeneous and does not depend on
the source. e unconcern of Gab users with respect to the source in terms of endorsement and
sentiment dynamics seems to provide further evidence for a mechanism of reinforcement that tend
to interpret every news within a collective narrative that is typically found in echo chambers.
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